Abstract:John Lachs considers his major philosophical contributions to be his work on mediation, the love of life, and his explication of George Santayana's philosophical and literary outlooks. All three are undergirded by Lachs's effort to make philosophy relevant to people's lives. This article examines these three contributions with both a critical eye and an admiration for Lachs's efforts. The conclusion provides an assessment often missed in critiques of Lachs's work.

Interpretations of Poetry and Religion is the third volume in a new critical edition of the complete works of George Santayana that restores Santayana's original text and provides important new scholarly information.Published in the spring of 1900, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion was George Santayana's first book of critical prose. It developed his view that "poetry is called religion when it intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely supervenes upon life, is seen to be nothing but poetry." This statement (...) and the point of view it espoused contributed significantly to the debate between science and religion at the turn of the century, and its eloquence and clearsightedness continue to have an impact on current discussions about the nature of religion.Interpretations of Poetry and Religion affronted Santayana's peers with its assault on literary and religious pieties of the cultivated classes. William James called its philosophy of harmonious and integral ideal systems nothing less than "a perfection of rottenness."In his insightful introductory essay, Joel Porte observes that while Santayana's theory of correlative objects, his espousal of the "ideal" - the normal human affinity for abstraction - and exaltation of the imagination may have offended some at Harvard, these ideas had a significant influence on other Harvard scholars T.S. Eliot and Santayana's "truest disciple," Wallace Stevens.Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., heads the Department of Philosophy and Humanities at Texas A & M University. William G. Holzberger is a Professor of English at Bucknell University. Joel Porte is Whiton Professor of American Literature at Cornell University. (shrink)

This bibliographical checklist has its origins in a conflation of two previous bibliographies, those of Shohig Terzian and Ceferino Santos Escudero, S.J. These basic listings were considerably amplified by materials discovered during research for the complete critical edition of Santayana's work, and this bibliography remains an essential resource for Santayana scholars.

A penetrating and illuminating exchange of views between Richard Rorty, a highly influential and sometimes controversial philosopher, and seven of his most thoughtful critics, providing new insights into the impact of his work on contemporary American philosophy.

Herman J. Saatkamp’s _A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections_ gathers together his work of a lifetime. There are twenty-three pieces, in three sections: “Santayana and Philosophy,” “Editorship,” and “Genetic Concerns and the Future of Philosophy.”.

Decisions related to animal welfare standards depend on farmer’s multiple goals and values and are constrained by a wide range of external and internal forces. The aim of this paper is twofold, i.e., to develop a theoretical framework for farmers’ AW decisions that incorporates farmers’ goals, use and non-use values and to present an approach to empirically implement the theoretical framework. The farmer as a head of the farm household makes choices regarding production to maximize the utility of the household. (...) The overall utility of the farmer is determined by his multiple objectives. For the analysis of multi-objective problems, the multiple criteria decision - making paradigm provides an appropriate theoretical framework. However, theories from the field of social-psychology are needed to facilitate the identification of all relevant aspects in the decision making. The practical use of the conceptual framework is demonstrated using a simple numerical application of a multi-objective programming model. Two workshops were devoted to examining the scientific consistency and the practical usefulness of the approach. Implementing this approach will increase knowledge of the main factors and barriers that determine farmers’ decisions with regard to AW standards. This knowledge is relevant during the development of new AW concepts that aims to supply products that comply with above-legal AW standards for middle-market segments. (shrink)

Expressions of the form 'S is aware of the fact that p' are commonplace. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than (...) knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as ‘first’ in recent epistemology. (shrink)

Scepticism and Animal Faith marks a turning point in Santayana’s philosophy leading to the development of his complete naturalism, and, if followed, leads to a decisive change in philosophical inquiry that was a century ahead of his time. Indeed, much of what Santayana explicates in this book is now central to inquiries in the social and biological sciences that attempt to understand human behavior. In short, he turns philosophy on its head. Before Santayana, philosophers often thought humans were distinct from (...) other animals because of their reasoning and their ability to act based on thinking through difficulties and then deciding to proceed in the most beneficial way. This approach was widely endorsed from Plato to American pragmatism. However, Santayana’s orientation is dramatically different focusing on animal faith and not human reason. He is a complete non-reductive naturalist.In this article, I examine the implications of Santayana turning to animal faith as a basis for understanding human action. To the surprise of his contemporaries, he no longer considered humans unique from other animals nor perhaps even more complicated in their interactions with their environment. Mental consciousness or spirit is a reflection, an after effect, of animals acting and responding in a physical environment. He suggests an analogy to the sound of music produced by an orchestra. Consciousness or spirit is not causal. For the most part it is momentary, lasting only so long as it is generated by our physical being, what he calls psyche. Hence, rather than being a philosopher who recognizes reason and mind as unique in causing human action, he notes that our actions, like that of all animals, are caused by our psyche’s physical interaction with its environment. Such a move abandons philosophy as a discipline focusing on reason as the basis for action. One might think this lessens the value of consciousness, but not for Santayana. Spirit is celebrational and to be cherished. Indeed, a principal goal of human life is to cultivate a spiritual life. Santayana’s naturalistic approach also leads to a distinct understanding of human cultures, their value, and the political structures involved in various human organizations. There is no hierarchy of best or better, only the reality of human societies serving their constituents in differing ways, much as we might describe the social structures of other animals. If the goal is to provide the greatest range of opportunities for the greatest number of people, one may find evidence that some societies enable more people to live well, but no one political structure is likely to accomplish that in all human environments. Even so, Santayana explores the natural values of charity and justice as central to human societies enabling individual humans to flourish. (shrink)

_Contributes a black Atlantic perspective to postmodernism, theology, and metaphysics._.

The study of metaphor is now firmly established as a central topic within cognitive science and the humanities. We marvel at the creative dexterity of gifted speakers and writers for their special talents in both thinking about certain ideas in new ways, and communicating these thoughts in vivid, poetic forms. Yet metaphors may not only be special communicative devices, but a fundamental part of everyday cognition in the form of 'conceptual metaphors'. An enormous body of empirical evidence from cognitive linguistics (...) and related disciplines has emerged detailing how conceptual metaphors underlie significant aspects of language, thought, cultural and expressive action. Despite its influence and popularity, there have been major criticisms of conceptual metaphor. This book offers an evaluation of the arguments and empirical evidence for and against conceptual metaphors, much of which scholars on both sides of the wars fail to properly acknowledge. (shrink)

Philosophy as a discipline is facing new challenges that will determine its future. The challenges include the historic ones relating to economic conditions and administrative leadership that focuses on preparation for employment in a way that lessens the intellectual development of students. But the new challenges occur in a worldwide democratic recession and in political leadership that seems to be moving toward greater censorship and less academic freedom. In America, this is also occurring with a decline in student enrollment that (...) negatively impacts the liberal arts and particularly philosophy. This article examines the way two forms of American naturalism may respond. John Dewey’s cultural naturalism and George Santayana’s thorough, non-reductive naturalism provide an array of alternatives. I explore alternatives open to philosophers that include abandoning philosophy by leaving the university or becoming an administrator as well as alternatives available if one remains in the university. Finally, I offer four criteria for judging the viability of choosing any of the alternatives. (shrink)

Philosopher, poet, literary and cultural critic, George Santayana is a principal figure in Classical American Philosophy. His naturalism and emphasis on creative imagination were harbingers of important intellectual turns on both sides of the Atlantic. He was a naturalist before naturalism grew popular; he appreciated multiple perfections before multiculturalism became an issue; he thought of philosophy as literature before it became a theme in American and European scholarly circles; and he managed to naturalize Platonism, update Aristotle, fight off idealisms, and (...) provide a striking and sensitive account of the spiritual life without being a religious believer. His Hispanic heritage, shaded by his sense of being an outsider in America, captures many qualities of American life missed by insiders, and presents views equal to Tocqueville in quality and importance. Beyond philosophy, only Emerson may match his literary production. As a public figure, he appeared on the front cover of Time (3 February 1936), and his autobiography (Persons and Places, 1944) and only novel (The Last Puritan, 1936) were the best-selling books in the United States as Book-of-the-Month Club selections. The novel was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, and Edmund Wilson ranked Persons and Places among the few first-rate autobiographies, comparing it favorably to Yeats's memoirs, The Education of Henry Adams, and Proust's Remembrance of Things Past. Remarkably, Santayana achieved this stature in American thought without being an American citizen. He proudly retained his Spanish citizenship throughout his life. Yet, as he readily admitted, it is as an American that his philosophical and literary corpuses are to be judged. Using contemporary classifications, Santayana is the first and foremost Hispanic-American philosopher. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Life and Publications Naturalism, Creative Imagination, and Pragmatism America Conclusion.

Larry Hickman has fostered his own analysis, explication and application of Dewey’s philosophy as well as overseen the critical edition of John Dewey’s works at the Center for Dewey Studies. In America our democracy is struggling, making Hickman’s scholarly work even more important. I attempt to explain some of Hickman’s use of Dewey’s philosophy to address current issues that include the roles of religion and education in American democracy. Much of Hickman’s pragmatic naturalism provides hope for democracy as a way (...) of life and as a governmental organization. But will that hope meet contemporary challenges in our society? I suggest some possible limitations to Dewey’s and Hickman’s views but highlight the central role both play in American philosophy. (shrink)

When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...) independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other. (shrink)

[This is a paper that was originally written in 2017 and doesn't represent Silva's current thinking about the relation between belief and degrees of confidence. See On Believing and Being Convinced for more.] Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the metaphysical relation between belief and credence. It is (...) generally assumed that a Lockean metaphysics of belief that reduces outright belief to degrees of confidence would immediately effect a unification of coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. Scott Sturgeon has suggested that the unification is effected by understanding the relation between outright belief and confidence as an instance of the determinable-determinate relation. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge”—knowledge and rational belief in the absence of rational confidence. We contend that there are genuine cases of mistuned knowledge and that, therefore, epistemological unification must forego token identity of belief and high confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence even without token-identity. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification. (shrink)

This papers deals with examples offered by Adams, Austin and others which seem to show that `if' does not conform to all of the laws of the conditional. These a reconciled by treating them as conjunctions with embedded modalities.